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This paper describes and analyzes the impact of policies of globalization and liberalization 
on the agrarian economy of India. In particular, it discusses the reversal of land reform, 
changes in the policies of administered agricultural input costs and output prices, 
cutbacks in public investment in rural physical and social infrastructure, the dismantling 
of the institutional structure of social and development banking, the withdrawal of 
quantitative restrictions on the import of agricultural products, cutbacks in the public 
distribution system, and the undermining of national systems of research and extension 
and protection of national plant and other biological wealth. The data used in the paper 
come from the major sources of national-level official statistics and primary data collected 









1.  Introduction 
The subject of this paper is the impact of policies of so-called stabilization and 
structural adjustment, or liberalization and globalization, on the agrarian economy of 
India. These are policies that have been imposed, in differing degrees, on the people of 
the Third World by international capital and domestic bourgeoisies for more than two 
decades now, and we shall examine their specific form and impact on the Indian 
countryside (Ramachandran and Swaminathan 2002). In India, although there are 
continuities between the era of globalization and preceding periods, particularly after 
1984, the sharp acceleration of the policies of neoliberal reform can be said to have 
occurred after 1991, when the Congress Government in which the present Prime 
Minister was first made Finance Minister came to power. 
In order to understand the impact of globalization and liberalization in rural 
India, it is important to understand the nature of the agrarian question, and, in turn, the 
class character of the state in India. Landlords are a constituent part of the state in India, 
and nothing in the present situation has undermined landlordism as a fundamental 
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barrier to agrarian and general social progress. At the same time, the general class policies 
of the Indian state in the countryside, and, specifically, its collaboration with 
imperialism, have taken qualitatively new forms since 1991. 
This paper begins with a discussion of land reform and landlordism. We discuss 
the interconnections between landlordism, moneylender-merchant exploitation and caste 
and gender oppression in the countryside, and argue that neo-liberalism has not lessened 
the tactical or strategic importance of addressing these issues.  
Next, we attempt to show how state policy has acted as a vast depressor in the 
countryside, and we document the reversal of policies of administered agricultural input 
costs and output prices, cutbacks in public investment in rural physical and social 
infrastructure, the dismantling of the institutional structure of social and development 
banking, the withdrawal of quantitative restrictions on the import of agricultural 
products, cutbacks in the public distribution system, and the undermining of national 
systems of research, extension and the protection of national plant and other biological 
wealth.  
The paper uses data from, first, the major sources of national-level official data, 




2.  The Reversal of Land Reform 
Genuine agrarian reform alters class relations in favour of the working people, 
frees demand constraints and opens up home markets in the countryside, and provides a 
basis for broad-based productive investment. The promise of land reform was part of our 
freedom movement, a promise betrayed in practice by the ruling classes in the years 
following Independence.  
In India today, however, land reform as conceived during the Independence 
movement and in the first decades after Independence, has been jettisoned by official 
policy, and reversed in certain areas in favour of counter-reform.1 Legislation is being 
considered and has been passed that raises ceilings to levels that undermine the objectives 
of land ceiling laws and make absentee farming by large owners and corporations a 
certainty. Such policies reduce the extent of land for redistribution, accelerate the loss of 
land by poor peasants and worsen inequalities in the distribution of land.  
One of the objectives of land reform is the destruction of landlordism. A major 
feature of landlordism is the concentration of ownership of land and other assets in the 
hands of landlords, that is, of a class that does not work on the major manual operations 
on the land and is a historical participant in the land monopoly. The data are clear that 
the state has not abandoned the slogan of land reform because this class – and such 
concentration of wealth – has ceased to exist. On the contrary, data from the National 
Sample Survey (Table 1) and from recent village studies (Table 2) show the continuation 
of very sharp inequality.  
In Table 1, data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) indicate that the degree 
of concentration in the distribution of operational and ownership holdings of land has 
marginally increased over the last four decades.2  
Table 2 presents data from different villages across India; these are the first nine 
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villages surveyed as part of the Project on Agrarian Relations in India. As can be seen, the 
surveys have been conducted across a variety of agrarian regimes – in surface-irrigated, 
lift-irrigated, and unirrigated tracts – across the country. The immediate conclusion is 
that, although there are differences of degree, sharp inequalities persist in respect of the 
ownership of land.3 
With regard to the actual redistribution of land, an estimate from official data by 
a senior member of the All-India Kisan Sabha4 illustrates the chasm between potential 
and performance in India. Working with a ceiling of 25 acres a household, ‘no less than 
63 million acres of land would have been available in the mid-1950s and early 1960s for 
distribution among landless and land-poor farmer households’ (Mishra 2007). The 
reality, according to the Annual Report of the Ministry of Rural Development 2006-07, 
is that only 4.89 million acres of land were distributed over the first 60 years of 
Independence (Mishra 2007). A recent estimate based on the NSSO’s Survey on Land 
and Livestock Holdings (2002-03) suggests that the current extent of ceiling-surplus land 
is more than three times the extent of land that has ever been redistributed under land 
reform (Rawal 2008). 
 
 
3.  Public Investments in Agriculture and Rural Infrastructure (Particularly 
Irrigation and Roads) Slowed Down Substantially 
Economists are familiar with the concept of complementarity between public and 
private expenditure; when the state withdraws from investment in public works, 
infrastructure and programs of mass employment, it robs the countryside of the 
foundations for growth and the means of poverty alleviation. 
Fiscal contraction is at the core of current policy, and Table 3, which shows the 
trends in public investment in agriculture and allied activities, shows that the decline in 
public investment in agriculture started in the 1980s and accelerated further in the 
1990s. By the end of 1990s, public investment in agriculture and allied activities was 
only about 1.6 percent of agricultural GDP and about 6.6 percent of total gross capital 
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Table 3 Gross capital formation in agriculture and allied activities as a proportion of 
agricultural GDP and as a proportion of gross capital formation in all activities (percent) 
 
Year As a proportion of GDP from 
agriculture and allied activities 
As a proportion of gross capital 
formation in all activities 
1960-61 1.8 11.2 
1965-66 2.1 10.5 
1970-71 1.8 11.9 
1979-80 4.2 13.9 
1980-81 3.7 15.6 
1981-82 3.6 12.0 
1982-83 3.7 11.2 
1983-84 3.4 11.6 
1984-85 3.4 10.5 
1985-86 3.3 9.4 
1986-87 3.2 8.3 
1987-88 3.3 9.8 
1988-89 2.8 8.6 
1989-90 2.5 7.2 
1990-91 2.3 6.8 
1991-92 2.0 6.3 
1992-93 2.0 6.5 
1993-94 2.0 6.9 
1994-95 2.2 6.8 
1995-96 2.2 7.4 
1996-97 2.0 7.6 
1997-98 1.8 6.9 
1998-99 1.6 6.6 
1999-00  1.9 6.0 
2000-01  1.8 5.7 
2001-02 2.1 6.6 
2002-03 2.0 6.4 
2003-04 2.3 7.0 
2004-05 2.9 7.4 
2005-06 3.4 7.6 
2006-07 3.7 7.9 
 
Source: Thulasamma (2002), EPW Research Foundation (2002), Agricultural Statistics 




4. Financial Liberalization After 1991 Decimated the Institutional 
Structure of Rural Banking in India 
Financial liberalization represented a clear and explicit reversal of the policy of 
social and development banking, such as it was, and contributed in no small way to the 
extreme deprivation and distress of which the rural poor have been victims since the early 
1990s. 
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It is well known that the burden of indebtedness in rural India is very great, and 
that, despite major structural changes in credit institutions and forms of rural credit in 
the post-independence period, the exploitation of the rural masses in the credit market is 
one of the most pervasive and persistent features of rural life in India.  
Historically, there have been four major problems with respect to the supply of 
credit to the Indian countryside. First, the supply of formal credit to the countryside as a 
whole has been inadequate. Second, rural credit markets themselves have been imperfect 
and fragmented. Third, as the foregoing suggests, the distribution of formal credit has 
been unequal, particularly with respect to region and class, caste and gender in the 
countryside. Formal sector credit needs specially to reach backward areas, income-poor 
households, people of the oppressed castes and tribes, and women. Fourth, the major 
source of credit to rural households, particularly income-poor working households, has 
been the informal sector. Informal sector loans, typically, are advanced at very high rates 
of interest. Further, the terms and conditions attached to these loans have given rise to an 
elaborate structure of coercion – economic and extra-economic – in the countryside. 
That these constitute what may be called the ‘problem of rural credit’ has been 
well recognized; recognized, in fact, in official evaluations and scholarship since the end 
of the nineteenth century. Given the issues involved, the declared objectives of public 
policy with regard to rural credit in the post-independence period, were in the words of a 
former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, ‘to ensure that sufficient and timely 
credit, at reasonable rates of interest, is made available to as large segment of the rural 
population as possible’ (Rangarajan 1996). The policy instruments to achieve these 
objectives were to be: first, extending the geographical and functional reach of the formal 
sector; second, directed lending; and third, concessional or subsidized credit (Rangarajan 
1996). Public policy was thus aimed not only at meeting rural credit needs, but also at 
pushing out the informal sector and the exploitation to which it subjected borrowers. 
Rural credit policy in India envisaged the provision of a range of credit services, including 
long-term and short-term credit and large-scale and small-scale loans to rural households.  
The period from 1969 to the present can be characterized as representing, 
broadly speaking, three phases in banking policy vis-à-vis the Indian countryside. The 
period immediately following bank nationalization was also the early phase of the ‘green 
revolution’ in rural India, and one of the objectives of the nationalization of banks was 
for the state to gain access to new liquidity, particularly among rich farmers, in the 
countryside. The declared objectives of the new policy with respect to rural banking – 
what came to be known as ‘social and development banking’ – were: (i) to provide 
banking services in previously unbanked or under-banked rural areas; (ii) to provide 
substantial credit to specific activities including agriculture and cottage industries; (iii) to 
provide credit to certain disadvantaged groups, such as for example, Dalit and scheduled 
tribe households. 
The second phase, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was a period 
when the rhetoric of land reform was finally discarded by the ruling classes themselves, 
and when the major instruments of official anti-poverty policy were programs for the 
creation of employment. Two strategies for employment generation were envisaged, 
namely wage employment through state-sponsored rural employment schemes and self-
employment by means of loans-cum-subsidy schemes targeted at the rural poor. Thus 
began a period of directed credit, during which credit was to be directed towards ‘the 
weaker sections’ of society. 
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The third and current phase, which began in 1991, is that of liberalization.  
 
There has been much recent research on financial liberalization and rural credit in India.6 
The main features of the post-liberalization phase are the following: 
 
 Social and development banking ceased to be official policy. The policy objectives 
of this phase are encapsulated in the Report of the Committee on the Financial 
System, a Committee appointed by the Reserve Bank of India which called for ‘a 
vibrant and competitive financial system…to sustain the ongoing reform in the 
structural aspects of the economy’. The Committee said that redistributive 
objectives ‘should use the instrumentality of the fiscal rather than the credit 
system’ and, accordingly, that ‘directed credit programs should be phased out’. It 
also recommended that interest rates be deregulated, that capital adequacy norms 
be changed (to ‘compete with banks globally’), that branch licensing policy be 
revoked, that a new institutional structure that is ‘market-driven and based on 
profitability’ be created, and that the part played by private Indian and foreign 
banks be enlarged (Reserve Bank of India 1991). 
 
 The expansion of public-sector rural banking was ended, and a large number of 
rural branches of commercial banks were actually shut down after 1995 (Table 4, 
Figure 1). 
 
 The credit-deposit ratios of rural commercial bank branches fell sharply between 
1991 and 2004 (Table 5, Figure 2). 
 
 Inter-State inequalities in rural banking increased, and regions where banking has 
historically been underdeveloped suffered the worst (Table 6).7 
 
 Priority-sector advances fell, and, with that, so did the shares of credit to 
agriculture, to cultivators owning two hectares or less, and to Dalit and Adivasi 
households (Tables 7-8, Figures 3-4) (see Chavan 2007). 
 
 The share of informal-sector credit in the principal borrowed by rural households 
is very high (Table 9), and has increased over the liberalization phase. 
 
There was a partial recovery in provision of formal-sector credit to rural areas after 
2001. While the supply of rural credit started to increase in 2001, the major expansion in 
provision of rural credit, and a clear break from the earlier policy of withdrawal of 
formal-sector banking from rural areas, took place since 2004 (Tables 5 and 6, Figures 2 
and 3).  It is noteworthy that, by 2008, the credit-deposit ratio of rural branches of 
scheduled commercial banks went back to the level in 1991. Table 3, which discusses 
trends in public investment, shows that the share of agriculture and allied activities in 
total public investment also started to increase in 2004-05. Reversal of trends in rural 
credit and public investment was made possible because of the space opened by 
dependence of the UPA government on the Left parties for its survival.8 The Left, in its 
demands, identified collapse of rural credit and decline in public investment as major 
causes of rural distress and actively lobbied for expansion of provision of formal-sector 
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credit to rural areas and public investment in agriculture. 
It would, however, be pertinent to point out that the actual increase in supply of 
credit provided for agriculture after 2001 was less than what the numbers in Tables 5 and 
7 suggest. Over this period, the scope of priority sector and indirect agricultural credit 
was expanded by including additional activities within their purview. For example, credit 
given by banks to non-banking finance companies for onwards lending for agriculture, 
loans for construction of ware houses and marketing facilities for agricultural 
commodities, subscription to bonds issued by Rural Electrification Corporation, finance 
given to agri-business centres, and much of the loans given to State Electricity Boards and 
power distribution companies were considered as indirect credit to agriculture (see 
Chavan and Ramakumar 2007). As shown in Figure 4, the share of indirect credit in 
total agricultural credit increased dramatically after 2001. Correspondingly, share of 




Table 4 Number of rural branches of scheduled commercial banks, India, 1978 to 2007 
 
 
Source: Banking Statistics and Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in 
India, various issues. 
 
Note: As has been pointed out by Ramakumar (2009), bank branches were classified into rural, semi-urban 
and urban until 1994 using the 1981 Census, between 1994 and 2005 using the 1991 Census, and from 
2006 onwards using the 2001 Census. He shows that, because of these revisions in the classification of 
branches, the numbers are not strictly comparable across these sub-periods. However, despite this problem, 
the overall trends – of increase in number of rural branches until 1994 and a decline thereafter – are clearly 
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Figure 1 Number of rural branches of scheduled commercial banks, India, 1978-2007 
 
Source: Banking Statistics and Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in 
India, various issues. 
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Source: Banking Statistics and Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in 
India, Reserve Bank of India, various issues. 
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Figure 2 Credit-deposit ratios of rural branches of scheduled commercial banks, India, 1981 
to 2007 (percent) 
 
Source: Banking Statistics and Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in 
India, Reserve Bank of India, various issues. 
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Table 6 Credit-deposit ratios of rural branches of scheduled commercial banks, by States, 
1991, 1996, 2001 and 2007 (percent) 
Region/State 1991 1996 2001 2007 
NORTHERN REGION 48 39 38 60 
Haryana 67 44 41 64 
Himachal Pradesh 37 27 22 38 
Jammu & Kashmir 33 15 15 54 
Punjab 44 44 50 56 
Rajasthan 66 48 46 81 
NORTH-EASTERN REGION 63 49 31 54 
Arunachal Pradesh 28 13 15 22 
Assam 65 58 32 59 
Manipur 101 113 95 132 
Meghalaya 50 29 22 43 
Mizoram 49 28 51 82 
Nagaland 62 48 28 82 
Tripura 128 84 35 44 
EASTERN REGION 51 40 25 45 
Bihar and Jharkhand 48 37 20 39 
Orissa 82 60 39 70 
West Bengal 44 37 23 39 
CENTRAL REGION 52 36 29 49 
Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh 69 50 39 62 
Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal 47 32 26 45 
WESTERN REGION 62 48 47 62 
Goa 19 15 12 16 
Gujarat 60 44 37 47 
Maharashtra 75 63 70 92 
SOUTHERN REGION 91 78 66 95 
Andhra Pradesh 95 86 76 114 
Karnataka 88 72 68 88 
Kerala 65 54 53 76 
Tamil Nadu 102 84 58 90 
ALL-INDIA 60 47 39 61 
Source: Banking Statistics and Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in 
India, Reserve Bank of India, various issues. 
 
 
  69  
Table 7 Share of priority sector and agricultural loans in outstanding credit (percent) 
Year Priority sector Agriculture 
1981 36 17 
1985 40 17 
1986 41 17 
1988 44 17 
1991 38 15 
1995 34 11 
1996 33 11 
1997 35 11 
1998 35 11 
1999 35 10 
2000 37 10 
2001 33 10 
2002 33 10 
2003 32 11 
2004 35 11 
2005 36 11 
2006 36 13 
2007 36 13 
 
Source: Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Reserve Bank of India, various issues. 
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Figure 3 Share of priority sector and agricultural loans in outstanding credit (percent) 
 
Source: Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Reserve Bank of India, various issues. 
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Table 8 Share of advances to ‘weaker sections’ in net bank credit of public and private sector 
banks, 1991 to 2008 (percent) 
Year Public sector banks Private sector banks All banks 
1991 10 5 10 
1992 10 5 9 
1993 9 4 9 
1994 9 3 9 
1995 8 3 8 
1996 8 2 8 
2001 7 2 6 
2002 7 2 7 
2003 7 2 6 
2004 7 1 6 
2005 9 1 7 
2006 8 2 7 
2007 7 2 6 
2008 9 2 8 
 
Source: Chavan (2007), and Trends and Progress of Banking in India, Reserve Bank of 
India, various issues. 
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Figure 4 Share of indirect credit in total agricultural advances, 1975 to 2008, percent 
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5. The Peasantry Faces a Two-pronged Attack From Falling Commodity 
Prices and Rising Input Costs 
It is now impossible to ensure adequate incomes among the peasantry if they are 
not protected from the ravages of adverse product and input markets. Most peasants are 
net buyers of food grain, and thus victims of inflation in food prices as well. The costs of 
cultivation have risen steeply, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s. The rise in the 
costs of seed, fertilizer, irrigation and the use of machinery has been particularly steep in 
the recent period.  
As a consequence of India’s joining the World Trade Organization, Indian 
agriculture has been exposed, in a new and unprecedented way, to volatility in the 
international prices of food and non-food crops and, in the case of several commodities, 
prolonged periods of steep declines in prices (see for instance, Ghosh 2005). The most 
important policies of the Government of India in this regard are, of course, the removal 
of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of a very wide range of agricultural 
commodities, including wheat and wheat products, rice, pulses, edible oils and 
agricultural seeds, and substantial cuts in import tariffs on crops. New incentives and 
support to exports of agricultural commodities will inevitably have an impact on land use 
and cropping pattern, as will the decision to ‘decanalize’ and allow and encourage private 
agencies in the agricultural export sector. 
In addition, the Minimum Support Prices (MSP) announced by the Government 
to ensure remunerative prices have not compensated for the actual costs of production 
per unit of output for most crops in a majority of States. Further, the very policy of MSP 
has not been implemented in most States.  
This problem of peasant incomes is particularly intense in the present context of 
the removal of quantitative restrictions on the import of agricultural products, the 
emphasis on export-oriented production, and the fall in the prices of primary 
commodities internationally. It is not fortuitous that the 1990s, the first decade of 
accelerated liberalization, was also the first period since the beginning of the ‘green 
revolution’ in which the rate of growth of food grain production was lower than the rate 
of growth of population in India.9 
The Left in India has demanded that the Government ensure that the costs of all 
inputs be controlled; that the system of MSP cover all 26 crops covered by the 
Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices; that fair and remunerative prices be 
offered through a country-wide crop procurement system; that a universal public 
distribution system be established; and that the Government reverse the abolition of 
quantitative restrictions and raise tariffs on the import of agricultural and agriculture-
related products. In the context of widespread crop damage, low yields and the ruin of 
vulnerable cultivators, a new demand is that a Farm Income Insurance Scheme be 
implemented rapidly in all disaster areas and subsequently be extended to all districts of 
the country and to all crops. 
Our survey data from Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra indicate 
the near-impossibility, in the present circumstances, of peasant households with two 
hectares of operational holdings or less earning an income sufficient for family survival. 
The daily per capita median income in the village with the highest median income was 
about Rs 24 (see Table 10).   
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The net annual incomes of a substantial section of the poor and middle peasantry 
from crop production are negative. The data in Table 12 are new and truly alarming. 
The Table shows that over 30 percent of cultivator-households in each of the three 
Andhra Pradesh households, 19 percent of cultivator-households in Nimshirgaon (a 
village in Kolhapur district), 18 percent of cultivator-households in Mahatwar (a village 
in eastern UP), 14 percent of cultivator-households in Harevli (a village in Bijnaur 
district in western UP) and 5 percent of cultivator-households in Warwat Khaderao (a 
village in Vidarbha) had negative net incomes from crop production. 
Annual incomes among Dalit and Adivasi households were substantially lower 
than the corresponding incomes among others (see Table 11). In Ananthavaram, a multi-
caste irrigated village in south coastal Andhra Pradesh, the mean annual income from 
crop production alone was negative (minus 624 rupees) for Dalit households and Rs 
27,892 for other cultivators. 
Food self-sufficiency has been a key component of India’s national sovereignty, 
and the new trends in the agrarian regime have very serious implications for land use, 
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6.  The Depressor Effect on Rural Employment 
As is clear from the foregoing, liberalization and globalization imply the 
imposition of deflationary policies on the countryside; their depressor effect on rural 
manual employment has been profound. The decline of public investment in agriculture, 
the decline in direct agricultural extension and information dissemination, and the 
consequent decline in agriculture itself have had a direct impact on the number of days of 
employment that a hired worker in rural India receives.10 
There are not good enough macro-data on the number of days of employment, 
agricultural and non-agricultural, per worker per year in India. Not only do the data 
from the Rural Labour Enquiries appear intuitively to be incorrect, but it is also well-
recognized that employment data from micro-studies show consistently lower volumes of 
employment than Rural Labour Enquiry data. There are, of course, major conceptual, 
definitional and methodological reasons for this divergence. This latter observation is as 
true now as it was twenty years ago.  
The village data from Andhra Pradesh illustrate the scarcity of the means of 
employment available today to a hired rural manual worker (Table 13).  
The prospects for employment are also disturbing indeed. Let us examine some 
factors that traditionally have influenced the volume of employment available to a rural 
manual worker.  
 
 
LABOUR ABSORPTION IN RICE AND WHEAT CULTIVATION 
The issues with regard to labour absorption have been summarized in 
Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2004). The main conclusions of that paper are that, 
with respect to wheat, mechanization has caused a secular decline in labour absorption. 
With regard to the cultivation of paddy, there has been, first, a decline in the 
employment of labour power per hectare. Secondly, female employment has been 
particularly affected by the decline in labour absorption. Thirdly, and as important, there 
are no viable technologies on offer today that involve higher levels of labour power input 




Much has been written on the causal links between an expansion of irrigation and 
an expansion of agricultural employment. It is entirely possible that irrigated area 
(groundwater- and surface-irrigated) may expand in certain regions and watersheds. 
Nevertheless, the question remains: given the nature of policies of so-called structural 
adjustment, is it likely that, in the aggregate, the rate of growth of either (i) direct or 
complementary investment necessary for the expansion of groundwater irrigation or  (ii) 
direct public investment necessary for the expansion of surface irrigation (large, medium 
or small scale) will rise to levels that are necessary to meet the demand for irrigation (or 
provide for sustained increase in employment) in rural India? In an earlier period in 
India’s development history, the answer may have been a qualified ‘yes’. Given the record 
of sharp decline in public investment in agriculture since 1991 (see Table 3), the answer 
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NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT 
An important lesson from rural development experience in India and elsewhere in 
the less developed countries is that schemes for large-scale employment of hired manual 
workers or large-scale schemes for self-employment are necessarily state-driven and state-
financed. The withdrawal of the state from state-sponsored employment schemes through 
the 1990s and early years of this decade is clear from Table 14.  
The major change in this regard came after the passage, under pressure from the 
Left, of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) by the present 
Parliament. The NREGA seeks to provide a guarantee of up to 100 days of employment 
per household. The scheme was introduced in 200 districts of India in 2005-06. In April 
2008, the program was extended to the rural areas of all districts in the country. The 
most important difference between the NREGA and previous wage employment 
programs is that the NREGA seeks to provide a guarantee of 100 days of employment per 
household to any rural household that demands it. Where employment is not provided 
within 15 days of a demand for employment, the scheme provides for an unemployment 
allowance to be paid to the household that demanded work.  
Data show that in 2007-08, the second full year of NREGA, about 1400 million 
person-days of work were generated in the 330 districts in which it was in operation in 
the year (Table 14). This was much higher than the work generated under previous wage 
employment programs. Data also show that, in 2007-08, on average, about 43 days of 
work were provided to households that participated in the program. The evidence 
suggests that in many areas where NREGA has been operational, the prospect of 
employment-generation under the scheme helped raise agricultural wage rates (Mehrotra 
2008, Dreze and Khera 2009). It is also noteworthy that of the total employment 
generated under the program, the share of employment gained by women was 48 
percent, by Dalit workers 31 percent, and by Scheduled Tribe workers 24 percent. 
  Although NREGA represents an important gain for the rural work force, we must 
also remember that the program provides a very limited guarantee of employment, and 
that it has been marred by serious obstacles and problems (Karat 2005, Gupta 2007). 
The implementation agencies, for example, have a restricted portfolio of works that can 
be undertaken under the scheme (Karat 2008). Banks have been reluctant to open zero-
balance accounts for workers who participate in NREGA. In many cases, the piece-rates 
under the program are low and, as a result, most workers are unable to do enough work 
on a sustained basis to earn the statutory minimum wage (Karat 2008). The nature of 
work provided and the Schedule of Rates are such that they typically discriminate against 
women workers who, on average, earn substantially lower wages than male workers 
(Karat 2008; ISWSD 2007). The unemployment allowance is seldom paid and, as a 
result, the goal of providing a guarantee of 100 days of work per household has not been 
achieved in practice. Evaluations have pointed out that, in most States, implementation 
of the scheme is fraught with problems such as delays in the payment of wages, a lack of 
work-site facilities (particularly for women), and corruption in the execution of work and 
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Table 14 Person days of employment created through wage employment schemes in rural areas, 
1990-91 to 2001-02, selected years 
Person days of employment under different wage 
employment schemes  
Year 
(in millions) Index 
1990-91 874 100 
1996-97 804 92 
2002-03 748 86 
2003-04 856 98 
2004-05 912 104 
2005-06 1116 128 
2006-07 905 104 
2007-08 1437 164 
Source: Economic Survey, different years and Mehrotra (2008). 
 
Notes: In 1990, the main wage employment schemes were National Rural Employment Program (NREP) 
and RLEGP. These were combined to form the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY). Later the Employment 
Assurance Scheme was introduced. In 2001, JRY was modified to Jawahar Rozgar Gram Sidhi Yojana 
(JGSY). In April 2002, all wage employment schemes were combined into the SGRY (Sampoorna 




LEAVING LAND FALLOW 
In situations characterized by rising costs, falling harvest-time prices, the absence 
of information through extension services on alternative crop-cultivation opportunities, 
and cutbacks in formal sector credit, cultivators may decide simply to leave land fallow. 
We have some documented cases of such shutdown in the boro season in West Bengal in 
2002 (see Rawal, Swaminathan and Ramachandran 2002), in Rayalaseema in Andhra 
Pradesh in 2005-06 and large tracts of land left fallow even in the Gang canal region of 
North West Rajasthan in 2007. This decision to leave land fallow was a direct 
consequence of the adverse impact of current policies on cultivators of different classes.  
 
 
LAND USE AND CROPPING PATTERN 
It is entirely possible that cropping pattern in some areas may change, in the short 
or medium term, towards crops that are more labour-absorbent per hectare than crops 
currently grown. Such changes in cropping patterns may be a result of spontaneous forces 
of commercialization and crop diversification; in future, however, they may increasingly 
be responses to niche-market and export demand, and controlled directly by Indian or 
multinational corporate interests. Such changes in cropping pattern must be evaluated 
not only with respect to their immediate impact on employment and farm incomes but 
from a broader perspective on land use, food security, and the preservation of our 
biodiversity. Thus, if over a large tract (part of a block or sub-district, say), the cultivation 
of gherkins or cherry tomatoes replaces food grain or a diverse range of other crops, that 
change must be evaluated in terms not only of short-term gains in income and 
employment, but also in terms of its impact on land use, food self-sufficiency and the 
environment and biodiversity. 
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7.  International Corporations and Indian Agriculture 
The new trade and patent regime leaves the field of agricultural research at the 
mercy of multinational corporations, thus weakening public-sector national agricultural 
research systems and open-access international research institutions. Further, this regime 
infringes on the rights of farmers and indigenous plant breeders and threatens to lead, in 
the words of India’s leading agricultural scientist, ‘from biodiversity to genetic slavery’.  
A significant new aspect of globalization and the agrarian economy is the new 
intervention by US corporations in agricultural policy and policy-making institutions. 
The new Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture (KIA), formally called the ‘US-India 
Knowledge Initiative on Agricultural Education, Teaching, Research, Service, and 
Commercial Linkages,’ seeks to tie the agrarian economy of India to US corporate 
interests.11 The KIA is to support certain activities related to agricultural research, 
education and extension that will help bring an ‘evergreen revolution’ based on 
‘environmentally-sustainable and market-oriented agriculture.’ Specifically, the KIA 
focuses on ‘capacity-building’ for education (including curriculum revision), food 
processing, biotechnology (particularly aimed at making transgenic crops the focus of 
Indian agricultural research) and water management (with emphasis on precision and 
high-tech agriculture).  
The agreement does not cover any funding for agricultural research and 
education by the United States Government. In fact, while the Government of India has 
already pledged Rs. 3500 million for the activities proposed, there has been no 
commitment from the United States. Documents available in the public domain make it 
clear that private funding from agribusiness corporations for research in public 
institutions in India will be linked to patent rights and licenses on products that emerge 
from such research.  
India’s agricultural research infrastructure and institutional setup expanded 
greatly in the post-independence period and is unmatched across most less-developed 
countries. In addition to a number of central institutions under the umbrella of the 
Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), there are a large number of State 
Agricultural Universities, Colleges and other institutions of higher learning. India has 
more than 7000 agricultural scientists and more than 40,000 agricultural extension 
workers. One aspect of KIA is that it is to be a means by which US agribusiness 
corporations gain access to this institutional setup and pool of scientists and technological 
personnel.  
KIA is to be designed and monitored by a governing board that has, as members, 
representatives of major US agribusiness and retail firms. The US side includes, among 
its eight members, representatives from Monsanto and Walmart and other business 
organiations. 
It is clear that an important objective of KIA is to bring a patent-protected regime 
of commercial agriculture to India that will, first, attempt to meet the demand for 
tropical agricultural products in the developed world, and secondly, to ensure large 
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8.  The Public Food Distribution System Has Been Set Back by Decades  
As a result of economic liberalization, major programs of food security were 
reversed.12  Three key objectives of economic reforms – and these are stated explicitly in 
many policy documents including different Economic Surveys – have been to reduce 
food subsidies, to leave distribution to the market and to restrict public systems for food 
distribution by means of policies of narrow targeting.  
Specifically, the central government introduced a policy of narrow targeting of 
the public distribution system (PDS), one of the pillars of food security policy in India. 
The PDS is a rationing mechanism that entitles households to specified quantities of 
selected commodities at subsidized prices. In most parts of the country, up to 1997, the 
PDS was universal and all households with a registered residential address, rural and 
urban, were entitled to rations. In 1996-97, a new system, the Targeted PDS, was 
introduced.  
The implementation of the Targeted PDS led to the large-scale exclusion of 
genuinely needy persons from the PDS. Recent evidence from the 61st Round of the 
National Sample Survey, conducted in 2004-05, make it clear that a large proportion of 
agricultural labour and other worker households, of households belonging to the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, of landless and near-landless households, and households in 
the lowest expenditure classes, are excluded from the PDS today. Swaminathan (2008b) 
defines households without a ration card or with an APL (Above Poverty Line) card as 
those effectively excluded from the PDS and those with a BPL (Below Poverty Line) card 
or an Antyodaya (‘poorest of the poor’) card as those effectively included in the PDS.13 
By this definition, the data show that there were only four States out of 27 (Tamil Nadu 
excluded) in which two-thirds or more of agricultural labour households were effectively 
included and 33 percent or less were effectively excluded from the PDS. These States 
were Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura (Table 15). The all-
India data indicate that 52 percent of agricultural worker households were effectively excluded 
from the PDS. The effective exclusion was 71 percent in Bihar and 73 percent in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
The exception is Tamil Nadu, which is the only State to have a universal system 
of PDS with rice available at Rs 2 a kilogram (reduced on 15 September 2008 to 1 rupee 
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Table 15 Distribution of agricultural worker households by possession of ration card, all 
States, rural areas, 2004-05 (percent)  
State Included in Public 
Distribution System 
Excluded from Public 
Distribution System 
All 
Andhra Pradesh 71 30 100 
Arunachal Pradesh 11 89 100 
Assam 31 69 100 
Bihar 29 71 100 
Chhattisgarh 54 46 100 
Goa 39 61 100 
Gujarat 62 38 100 
Haryana 49 51 100 
Himachal Pradesh 47 53 100 
Jammu & Kashmir 68 32 100 
Jharkhand 33 67 100 
Karnataka 70 30 100 
Kerala 53 47 100 
Madhya Pradesh 51 49 100 
Maharashtra 50 50 100 
Manipur 4 96 100 
Meghalaya 61 39 100 
Mizoram 15 85 100 
Nagaland 0 100 100 
Orissa 60 40 100 
Punjab 23 77 100 
Rajasthan 32 68 100 
Sikkim 58 42 100 
Tripura 67 33 100 
Uttar Pradesh 27 73 100 
Uttaranchal 43 57 100 
West Bengal 47 53 100 
All - India 48 52 100 
Source: National Sample Survey 2008, cited in Swaminathan 2008b. 
 
Note: ‘Excluded’ indicates a household with either no ration card or an above-the-poverty-line ration card; 





Targeting has affected the functioning and economic viability of the PDS 
network adversely and has weakened the public food delivery system. (The impact has 
been severe in a food-deficit state like Kerala – a state renowned for its well-functioning 
PDS before the introduction of targeting – where there has been a sharp decline in the 
quantity of grain sold through fair-price and ration shops.) Further, the Targeted PDS 
has failed to achieve the objective of price stabilization by means of a transfer of cereals 
from surplus to deficit regions of the country.  
While the size of subsidies – including food subsidies – is frequently criticized by 
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the ‘reformers,’ in reality, aggregate food subsidy has declined in recent years. The food 
subsidy, as defined in the Government of India’s budget (the operational deficit of the 
Food Corporation of India), remained at an average of 0.6 percent of GDP from the 
mid-Sixties to the end of the 1990s. Between 2002-03 and 2006-07, the food subsidy bill 
shrunk in absolute terms, from Rs 24,176 crores in 2002-03 to Rs 23,828 crores in 
2006-07 at current prices. As a share of GDP, food subsidies fell from 0.99 percent in 
2002-03 to 0.5 percent in 2007-08.  
In the last few months, the situation has changed; stocks of food grain with the 
Government have risen. In December 2008, rice and wheat stocks with the Government 
of India were 29.8 million tonnes against a buffer stock requirement of 16.2 million 
tonnes, that is, a surplus of 84 percent. The rise in stocks is the combined outcome of 
increased procurement and reduced distribution.  
 
 
Table 16 Central budgetary support for food subsidy, current prices, 2000 to 2007 
Year Food Subsidy 
(in 10 million rupees)
As percent of 
GDP 
2000-01 12010 0.57 
2001-02 17494 0.77 
2002-03 24176 0.99 
2003-04 25160 0.91 
2004-05 25800 0.83 
2005-06 23200 0.66 
2006-07 23828 0.62 
2007-08 25425 (budgeted) 0.54 
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey, different years 
 
 
After the recent general elections, the Government of India announced that it 
would draft a new National Food Security Act. The Government of India’s proposal for 
legislation as elaborated in a note circulated to all state governments has been criticized 
by the Left opposition in the Parliament as continuing the policy of exclusion and narrow 
targeting, of over-centralizing policy decisions with regard to food, and of allocating 
insufficient grain through the public distribution system.14   
The policies of large-scale exclusion of households from the PDS and continued 
cuts in allocation of food grain to States thus remain unchanged. It is clear that the 




9.  The Impact of the Left on National Rural Policy Over the Past 4.5 Years 
Has Been Limited, But Significant and Distinct  
First, continuous agitations by the Left in Parliament and by means of direct 
action slowed down the sharp decline in public expenditure and the rapid dismantling of 
the structure of public banking.  
Secondly, the most important nation-wide development intervention of the 
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present government, the National Rural Employment Guarantee program, was directly 
the result of Left intervention and pressure. 
Thirdly, the most important legislation directly affecting the right to livelihood of 
the Adivasi people, the Scheduled Tribe and Other Forest Dwellers (Recognition of 
Forest Rights) Act, was spearheaded by the Left in Parliament, and would never have 
become law without the attention to detail of the Left MPs, and without the struggles for 
forest rights of Left-led mass organizations. 
 
 
10.  Some Concluding Notes 
In conclusion, there are three features of the current situation that we shall 
highlight. First, the major force on the Left in India considers the Indian state to be the 
organ of the class rule of the bourgeoisie and landlords, led by the big bourgeoisie, who 
are in increasing collaboration – as a junior partner or subordinate ally – of imperialism. 
This is the view of the state that informs this paper, and we cannot emphasize enough 
that nothing in the present situation has undone landlordism as a fundamental barrier to 
agrarian and general social progress. By this view, the agrarian question has been, since 
Independence, and remains, the major national question in India. Any resolution of the 
agrarian question requires revolutionary change, including agrarian reform that targets 
landlordism, moneylender-merchant exploitation and caste and gender oppression in the 
countryside. Neo-liberalism has not lessened the tactical or strategic importance of this 
contradiction; recent developments have sharpened the contradiction rather than blunted 
it. 
Secondly, since 1991, state intervention and the part played by imperialism in the 
countryside – that is, the class policies of the state in rural India – have taken qualitatively 
new forms. As we have seen, state policy has acted as a vast depressor, reversing policies of 
administered agricultural input costs and output prices, scaling down public investment 
in rural physical and social infrastructure, dismantling the institutional structure of social 
and development banking, withdrawing quantitative restrictions on the import of 
agricultural products, restricting the public distribution system, and undermining 
national systems of research, extension and the protection of national plant and other 
biological wealth.  
Thirdly, globalization does not flatten out all local landscapes – the problems of 
the uneven development of capitalism have been accentuated under neo-liberalism. In the 
present situation, we need to study the common features of imperialist globalization and 
the transformation of rural societies – including the impact of globalization and 
liberalization – in specific situations.15 
The current situation thus raises a crucial issue for those involved in the 
movement for radical, progressive rural change in less developed countries. The solution 
to the agrarian question involves both direct class struggle in the diverse conditions of the 
Third World countryside (in the Indian context, it involves the struggle against 
landlordism, moneylender-merchant exploitation and caste and gender oppression) as 
well as the struggle against the new onslaught by imperialism and domestic bourgeoisies. 
How the links are to be made between the different aspects of the struggle for agrarian 
change is a crucial issue of theory and practice for the future of democratic movements in 
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1 A detailed evaluation of the legislation is in Ramachandran and Ramakumar (2000). 
See also Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2002), Hirashima (2000). 
2 For a discussion of the problems of the NSS database on ownership and operational 
holdings of land, see Rawal (2008) and Bakshi (2008). 
3 The village with the lowest concentration of ownership of land holdings, Dungariya in 
Rajasthan (row 8), is an Adivasi village in southern Rajasthan. The data from this village, 
where the development of the productive forces in agriculture has been relatively low, 
show that while differentiation in the distribution of holdings among the peasantry does 
exist, it is of a lower order than elsewhere.  
4 The All-India Kisan Sabha (or Peasant Union) is the largest organization of the 
peasantry in India. It has over 20 million members. 
5  While private investment rose in the 1980s and 1990s, it was by no means adequate. 
The share of agriculture in aggregate capital formation fell from 14.6 in the 1970s to 7.1 
in the 1990s (Thulasamma 2003). It follows that the situation with respect to the 
expansion of irrigated area (and the lack of access of small cultivators and the landless to 
irrigated land) is a serious and disturbing aspect of the present situation. 
6 Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2005) and the references in Chavan and 
Ramakumar (2007). 
7  See Chavan and Ramakumar (2007) and Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2005). 
8 The following parties comprise the Left in the two Houses of the Parliament: the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Communist Party of India, the All India 
Forward Bloc, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party. 
9  The rice economy of India has been particularly stagnant over the past two decades (see 
for instance, Surjit 2008). 
10 For a detailed discussion of neoliberal economic policy and rural employment, see 
Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2004). 
11   On this, see Rawal (2006) and Purkayastha (2006). 
12  For the data in this section, see Swaminathan (2008b); see also Swaminathan (2000). 
13  In 1997, the Public Distribution System was changed to Targetted Public 
Distribution System under which subsidized food grain are provided only to those 
households that were given BPL (Below Poverty Line) cards. Above Poverty Line 
households have a smaller entitlement and are provided food grain without any subsidy.  
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14 See the Resolution adopted at the National Convention for the Right to Food and 
Against Price Rise 26 August, New Delhi. 
http://www.cpim.org/statement/2009/08262009-food-conv-res.pdf. 
15 In an important paper, T.J. Byres has argued against ‘determinism’ with respect to 
globalization, and of ignoring (as did dependency theory in an earlier period) the 






Bakshi, A. (2008) ‘Social Inequality in Land Ownership in India: A Study with Particular 
Reference to West Bengal’, Social Scientist, 39(9-10): 95-116. 
 
Byres, T. J. (2002) ‘Paths of Capitalist Agrarian Transition in the Past and in the 
Contemporary World’, in V.K. Ramachandran and M. Swaminathan (eds), Agrarian 
Studies: Essays on Agrarian Relations in Less-Developed Countries (pp. 54-83). New Delhi: 
Tulika Books. 
 
Chavan, P. (2007) ‘Access to Bank Credit: Implications for Dalit Rural Households’, 
Economic and Political Weekly 42(31): 3219-3224. 
 
Dreze, J. and Khera, R. (2009) ‘The Battle for Employment Guarantee’, Frontline 26(1), 
3-16 January 2009. 
 
EPW Research Foundation (2002) National Account Statistics. Mumbai: EPW Research 
Foundation. 
 
Ghosh, J. (2005) ‘Trade Liberalization in Agriculture: An Examination of Impact and 
Policy Strategies with Special Reference to India’, occasional paper, Human Development 
Report 2005. New York: United National Development Program. 
 
Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation (2008) Agricultural 
Statistics at a Glance. New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation. 
 
Gupta, S. (2007) ‘The Significance and Limitations of India’s National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act in Addressing Rural Poverty’, paper presented at the 
International Conference and Workshop on 'Policy Perspectives on Growth, Economic 
Structures and Poverty Reduction', Beijing, June 3-9. 
http://www.networkideas.org/ideasact/Jun07/Beijing_Conference_07/Smita_Gupta.pdf.  
 
Hirashima, S. (2000) ‘Issues in Agricultural Reforms: Public Investment and Land 
Market Development’, Economic and Political Weekly 35(42): 3879-3884. 
 
Indian School of Women’s Studies and Development (ISWSD) (2007) ‘Implementation 
       90    
of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Submission to the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Rural Development’. New Delhi: Indian School of Women’s 
Studies and Development. 
 
Karat, B. (2005) ‘Towards Implementing the Rural Employment Guarantee Act’, People’s 
Democracy 29(42/43), 16 and 23 October 2005. 
 
Karat, B. (2008) ‘Stop Dilution of REGA’, People’s Democracy 32(20-21), 25 May-1 June 
2008. 
 
Mishra, S.K. (2007) ‘On Agrarian Transition in West Bengal’, The Marxist 23(3). 
 
Mehrotra, S. (2008) ‘NREG Two Years On: Where Do We Go from Here?’, Economic 
and Political Weekly, 2 August 2008. 
 
Government of India Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (2008) 
National Account Statistics. New Delhi: Central Statistical Organization, Ministry of 
Statistics and Program Implementation, Government of India. 
 
Purkayastha, P. (2006) ‘Indo-US Agricultural Initiative: Handing Indian Agriculture to 
Monsantos’, People’s Democracy 30(9), 26 February 2006. 
 
Ramachandran, V. K. and Ramakumar, R. (2000), ‘Agrarian Reforms and Rural 
Development Policies in India: A Note’, paper presented at the International Conference 
on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development organized by the Department of Agrarian 
Reform, Government of the Philippines and the Philippines Development Academy, 
Tagaytay City, 5-8 December 2000. 
 
Ramachandran, V. K. and Swaminathan, M. (2002) ‘Introduction’, in V.K. 
Ramachandran and M. Swaminathan (eds), Agrarian Studies: Essays on Agrarian Relations 
in Less-Developed Countries. New Delhi: Tulika Books. 
 
Ramachandran, V.K. and Swaminathan, M. (eds) (2005) Financial Liberalization and 
Rural Credit in India. New Delhi: Tulika Books. 
 
Ramakumar, R. (2000) ‘Magnitude and Terms of Tenancy in India: A State-wise 
Analysis of Changes, 1981-82 to 1991-92’, Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
55(3): 337. 
 
Ramakumar, R. (2009) ‘Declining Number of Rural Bank Branches in India’, ms., 
Mumbai: Tata Institute of Social Sciences. 
 
Ramakumar, R. and Chavan, P. (2007) ‘Revival of Agricultural Credit in the 2000s: An 
Explanation’, Economic and Political Weekly 42(52): 955-965. 
 
       91    
Rangarajan, C. (1996) ‘Rural India, The Role of Credit’, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin 
May 1996. Bombay: Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Rawal, Vikas (2006) ‘The Indo-US Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture: What Does it 
Have for Indian Farmers?’, ms., New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University. 
 
Rawal, V. (2008) ‘Ownership Holdings of Land in Rural India: Putting the Record 
Straight’, Economic and Political Weekly 43(10): 43-47. 
 
Reserve Bank of India (1991), ‘Report of the Committee on the Financial System’, 
(Chairman: M. Narasimham), Mumbai, India. 
 
Surjit, V. (2008) Farm Business Incomes in India: A Study of Two Rice Growing Villages of 
Thanjavur Region, Tamil Nadu, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calcutta, 
Kolkata. 
 
Swaminathan, M. (2000) Weakening Welfare: The Public Distribution of Food in India. 
Delhi: Leftword Books. 
 
Swaminathan, M. (2008a), ‘Public Distribution System and Social Exclusion’, The 
Hindu, Chennai, 7 May 2008. 
 
Swaminathan, M. (2008b) ‘Programs to Protect the Hungry: Lessons from India’, 
Department of Economic and Social Analysis (DESA) Working Paper no. 70. New York: 
United Nations. 
 
Thulasamma, L. (2003) ‘Investment in Agriculture: Trends and Issues’, paper presented 
at the All-India Conference on Agriculture and Rural Society in Contemporary India, 





V.K. Ramachandran is with the Social Sciences Division, Indian Statistical Institute, 
Kolkata, India. 
 
Vikas Rawal is with the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru 
University, New Delhi, India. 
 
